Kaplan Nuggets II: 1980-1984
To overrule Rubin twice, holding three cards
in his first suit, risks the possibility of more than verbal violence
"The Olympiad
final", TBW 12.1980, p. 11
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Declarer is in 7Hx
and is void in spades opposite Sx K Q J 10 4 at the dummy. Kaplan writes:]
"Seven hearts is a highly practical
contract, likely to make whenever West holds the spade ace (he will probably
lead it) and whenever East holds it (he will play it on dummy's king); and
there are still chances in diamonds, even if no one has the ace of spades."
"Coming through for
Rye" (report on the 1981 trials), TBW 1/1981, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
At Table Two, the Graves-Mittelman auction
to six clubs was natural, if inexplicable; certainly Mittelman didn't know what
Graves was doing, so why should I?
Ibid, p. 13
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Murray, North at Table One, deemed his hand
too strong for a 16-18 one notrump. Thus [after 1Cx-p-1Dx-(1Sx)] he faced a
fierce rebid problem at his second turn, which he solved, in the modern
fashion, with a cue-bid.
Ibid, p. 15
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Opponents bid and raise
diamonds, Rodwell has Axxx]
At Table One, Rodwell, West, competed up to
the three level, "knowing" that with East marked short diamonds [he
actually had xx] almost all of West’s honors would fit well with partner’s
hand. Alas, partner had no hand for them to fit with.
"Coming through for
Rye, II" (report on the 1981 trials), TBW 2/1981, p. 6
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Rodwell holds
J10753/10842/--/AQ72. At game all, partner passes, RHO opens 1D and he doubles]
West (...) entered the auction with the sort
of takeout double I thought only my wife made [as a result, declarer misguesses a crucial heart
queen]
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
At Table One, Granovetter, West, listened carefully to
all the club bidding (it is hard to see whom South was
showing his clubs to, if not to the defenders); he hit upon a club lead
[ensuring two ruffs for the defense]
"
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Holding a
monster: AKQxx/AKxx/---/AKxx Bramley hears RHO open 2NT showing a diamond
preempt; he cuebids four times
diamonds, ending at 6♠ making seven]
I must say that if any partner of mine bid like
Bramley, three diamonds, four diamonds, five diamonds, six diamonds, he'd be
flirting with disaster. However, Friesner was not spiteful, and, with
everything favorable, he made seven, 1460.
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Bramley, South at Table One, must have had two quite
different reactions to his right-hand opponent during the auction: irritation,
when Stayman's delicate four-diamond bid presented an insoluble problem; then
heartfelt gratitude, when Stayman indelicately sacrificed against the poor
contract he had pushed the opponent into.
Ibid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Defenders
at a grand slam make it easy for declarer, who had a brilliant line available]
The defenders deprived declarer of this pretty ending,
but not of his plus 1510
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The South hand, with which Cohen committed his unusual
notrump … was:
♠ 10 9 ♥ J 3 ♦ K Q 4 2 ♣ A Q 8
3 2
Ibid, p. 15
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Holding ♠
4 ♥ K J ♦ 8 6 3 ♣ J 7 6 5 4 3 2, Scheinberg passes partner's
1♦ opening bid but then enters the bidding repeatedly and ends at 5♣
doubled]
That's a lot of bidding on 5 points, but, after all. he could scarcely be expected to hold more than he had,
after the initial pass. There must be something wrong with that line of
reasoning, since five clubs was doubled and down 500.
Ibid, p. 16
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A while later, Katz, dealer on favorable
vulnerability, judged that this hand,
♠ Q 2 ♥ 7 ♦
J 10 9 8 ♣ A 10 8 6 5 4,
was suitable for a three-club opening. Alas, partner was void in clubs, and
the inelegant contract went four down, undoubled. At the other table, this hand
resisted (or perhaps never felt) the temptation to preempt, and played in a
gentle two spades, just making, to gain a strange 7 imps.
Ibid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
South's four-heart contract seems cold for five, with
six heart tricks plus five tricks, but remember that experts believe in playing
safely –so safely, sometimes, that they go down.
"
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The swing was caused by differing tactics from the two
Souths, inducing differing judgment from the two Easts. Manfield, South at
Table One, leaped to game, perhaps hoping for a sacrifice, while Rosner, at the
other table, crept to game, perhaps hoping to be doubled. Thus, Gerard, East,
saved against the contract that Friesner doubled.
Ibid, p. 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[They go to
the excellent 7 diamonds vulnerable; their non-vul. opponents sacrifice at 7
hearts]
The defenders got all their tricks against seven
hearts doubled … but that was down only six, 1100, so they lost 7 imps to
Katz's small slam. Does this scoring feel as wrong to you as it does to me?
<Today
it would have been 1400, a tied board>
Ibid, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[East opens
a weak 2♠]
Woolsey-Manfield, at Table One, had an ideal modern
method for this deal: a jump to four clubs showing a strong 5-5 in hearts and
clubs. North, appreciating his perfect cards, investigated slam with four
diamonds, and, when South cooperated, there they were.
Beautiful! Only, there doesn't seem to be any way to make the lovely contract.
(…) Stauber-Rosner, at the other table, had nothing but ancient, clumsy
methods: take-out double, and the leap to the dark to a likely game. The final
contract [3NT] was inelegant, but declarer made his ten tricks anyway, for plus
630, 13 imps more to Katz.
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Two East
players overcall 1♥ on J7-A10653-7532-63]
At one table in each match, the East player allowed
the absence of offense, defense, high cards and distribution to discourage
action, and here both North-South pairs inevitably strayed into three notrump.
Despite their failure to make a lead-directing overcall, both Easts found the
heart lead, and briskly set the contract.
"Bowls
of
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Munir-Fazli not only found hearts but bid confidently
to the excellent grand slam. Too confidently, perhaps, since Meckstroth placed
absolute faith in their bidding, and traded on the vulnerability to take a
sacrifice [on ♠J9862] that was far from obvious (ah, youth!) … That was
down nine, 1700 (…) which meant 11 absurd imps (this is the one aspect of
bridge scoring that is askew) to the
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
So, the British ladies added plus 650 at this table to
their plus 1090 at the other, winning 17 imps. In a way, the
"Bowls
of
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Note that this elegant line of play gave declarer
chanced against many four-one trump breaks. Of course, some might feel that the
elegance was sullied, in that declarer would have gone down against the actual
three-two break if West had returned a trump after ruffing the third club … Let us not carp, though; declarer had his plus 620.
Ibid, p. 15
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At the
Venice Cup they stay at 4♠; at the Bermuda Bowl, they reach 6♠]
The men bid more than the women on the next deal … The
slam is about 20%, so one can conclude that women bid better. However, with the
club ace ruffing out tripleton, and trumps splitting three-twp, the slam rolled
home –obviously, men are luckier.
Ibid, p. 17
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rodwell bid a bold, brave four diamonds. Alas, the
opponents turned nasty and doubled.
Ibid, p. 22
------------------------------------------------------------------
Masood-Zia, for
"Bowls
of
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[The famous
3NT redoubled of Meckwell]
Fazli, East, did not see why
his opponents should be able to make three notrump when he had 10 high-card
points opposite partner's opening bid, so he doubled. Meckstroth, North, with only his solid suit, had doubts too, so he
redoubled: "Are you sure, partner?" Rodwell, South, had not only
youthful optimism but an ace-king on the side, in the suit most likely to be
led; so he passed. And there they were, in a contract that could be set six
down, a mere 2200, if West found a club lead. West
pondered… and Captain Sanders, in the Vu-graph room, wondered if this was
really the way to play bridge when 68 imps up. Why not? West led a spadce and
Rodwell cheerfully took his nine tricks, plus 750, 12 imps.
Ibid, p. 11
-------------------------------------------------------------------
"Spring at the Falls", TBW 5/82, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------
My team survived this round without much trouble, but
I started a curiously disturbing pattern, a series of encounters with sons of
old friends; here I had played against Billy Cohen, Ralph's boy. (…) In the
round of 16 (…) my team was lucky to get by a team that included two Sidney
Lazards, pčre et fils. In the quarter finals (…)
please note, I faced Mike Becker, son of Mister. And one of my semi-final
opponents was to be Jim Jacoby, a chip off the old Ozzie. I have resolved that
when I start running into grandsons I shall give up the game.
Ibid, p.
9-10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rosenkranz recovered those imps immediately, when
Pavlicek doubled a cold game on suspicion (bid by everyone, but nowhere else
suspected so strongly).
Ibid, p. 15
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[A
singleton club lead makes it tricky for declarers, but there is a winning line]
Did the fourth declarer adopt the winning line? No
doubt Kay would have, and Wold, West, was so sure of it that he didn't bother
leading his singleton club.
Ibid, p. 16
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Both teams scored 980, but Mrs. Slaner nearly missed
the slam when she erred in her Blackwood response. An incautious question from
her screenmate, who found the zero-ace response hard to credit, put her back on
track, and she recovered nicely. No harm done –indeed, it was the best way to
get to the slam, since it left an opponent seething with fury.
"Spring at the Falls, II", TBW 6/82, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Meckstroth
overcalls 1♠ on Q8642/1064/J9762/---; Rodwell holding 17 pts bids game]
Still, I am not disposed to criticize Rodwell, North
at Table Two, for bidding game opposite a mere overcall –one of the merest
overcalls I have seen in recent times.
Ibid, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
It is thousand to one against you when you try to
recover a lot of points with blind shots in the dark, since you will lose too
many (you have a better chance playing down the middle). You must hope for
opportunities to take informed, intelligent positions different from the other
table but not clearly inferior.
Ibid, p. 15
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Three notrump turns to a lucky make so often that it
shouldn't be considered all luck.
"
-------------------------------------------------------------------
One question that is easier to ask than to answer is
whether it is wise, when protecting a 40-imp lead, (…) to stop with such
precision at partials on deals that will certainly be bid to games at the other
table.
Ibid, p. 17
-------------------------------------------------------------------
I make the slam about 42% (if it’s the worst you ever
bid, you are the greatest slam bidder there is). The Gods made it 100% -diamond
king onside, hearts 3-3, even spades 3-3 and the club jack onside in case of
need. One unlucky factor –it was nonvulnerable, so the swing was only 11 imps.
Ibid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Even with clubs two-two, the contract [3NT]
was headed for down one at least (maybe down four) if South found a spade lead
from
Q J 9 8 7 3 2/ A J 9 / 4/ J 10.
However, in a spectacular demonstration of
today’s "never lead the suit you’ve bid" fashion, Woolsey crossed up
declarer by leading the ace of hearts. Plus 400, 11 imps to France.
"Rosenblum Cup,
II", TBW 1/1983, p. 13
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[The USA six-man team
played against a French four-man team for the 1982 Rosenblum final]
The USA handicaps were that they had had a
more relaxing semi-final match, and that in each session one U.S. pair had to
sit out, chewing fingernails, developing headaches or sore throats, perhaps
risking ulcers by watching Rama. On a four-man team, questions as to a
player’s minor aches and pains, his cold symptoms burgeoning in the steady
Biarritz downpour -such questions never arise. At game time, the player sits
automatically in his appointed place, so he had better feel well. In my view,
therefore, a four-man team has the edge.
"Rosenblum Cup,
III", TBW 2/1983, p. 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------
If I were South, I would probably have led
ace of clubs, to look at dummy. I wouldn’t have liked what I saw.
"Trials for
Stockholm", TBW 3/1983, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[An unsound 6NT makes on a
squeeze]
... with East holding six hearts
along with all the length in spades, the twelfth trick dropped from heaven into
declarer’s lap, the reward for clean living, no doubt. (A sinful South would
have received a heart lead and continuation, which would probably mess up his
entries.)
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At both tables South
holds: KJ1097/A4/AK6/J82, opens 1NT, North goes to 3NT]
When I started to play bridge, everyone
would bid: one spade-two spades; two notrump-four spades. Plus 420, for a tied
board. Nowadays, for some reason that is far too subtle for me, it is
fashionable to open with one notrump. I admit that it makes no difference,
since the result, a tied board, is the same. Everyone went honorably down in
three notrump, no swing.
"Trials for Stockholm,
II", TBW 4/1983, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At love all, after RHO
deals and passes, South holds
--- / AKQ9874/10752/92]
The problem with opening four hearts on a
hand like South’s is that this inevitably acts as a sort of left-handed Texas,
transferring the opponents into four spades. Then, partner is supposed to judge
whether to let them play -but how can he, knowing little about South’s pattern?
"Waikiki
Vanderbilt", TBW 6/1983, p. 13
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Kay made 1NT while his
team-mates made 4H]
Kay’s one-notrump contract (...) could not
be defeated. Indeed, he ended up with an overtrick (he habitually overplays).
Ibid, p. 15
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Norman Kay makes the
killing lead]
Never fear! Norman led the five of hearts
(after coming home from a singularly unsuccessful National, some ten years ago,
I anonymously sent Norman a copy of Bob Ewen’s book on opening leads -maybe he
read it.)
Ibid, p. 17
-------------------------------------------------------------------
About undisciplined
preempts:
The young activists remember only the
occasions on which the enemy fall on their faces, owing to the clever preempt;
if the enemy get to a better spot than the other table, or make a contract down
there, that is owing to the usual ineptitude of teammates. (...) In my
opinion, the strictly preemptive effect of three-bids breaks about even
over the long run, with lucky and unlucky results about in balance (perhaps the
spade preempts show a small profit, the others a small loss). Three-bids can
show a decent profit, though, from their descriptive effect: if partner
knows within narrow limits what the preemptor holds, he can take informed
action while everyone else is groping in the dark.
"The Waikiki
Vanderbilt, II", TBW 7/1983, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------
After 16 boards, the totals were 68 to 2 -at
least KANTAR were on the scoreboard. No, they weren’t! One of the tables had
taken too much time, seriously inconveniencing the tournament directors, whose
afternoon tea might be delayed. Hungry and furious, the directors reacted by
penalizing both teams. (...) Despite the appeal by both teams, asking
that all penalties be waived, the powers that be remained firm. The remarkable
score stood: ROOT 64, KANTAR minus 4.
Ibid, p. 11-12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At game all, West has
doubled 2C and South redoubles; at the other table, East runs and finally goes
for 200]
Stansby, East at Table One, stood his ground
at two clubs redoubled, showing remarkable courage and discipline, which
doubtless will be rewarded handsomely on some other deal. Not on this one,
though. [Declarer made
2Cxx with two vulnerable overtricks, scoring 1510].
"East and West",
9/1983, p. 20
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Bergen deals at favorable
and opens 2D, a two-under for spades, on
A984/4/10643/9874]
At Table Two, Bergen, West, could
have opened with two spades, which would have been a preempt in clubs, but his
suit quality in clubs was shaky. Since this was so early in the match, he was
more disciplined than that -Marty made his preempt artificially in spades, his
best suit. [and led
opponents to play 4C down when they had prospects for game in 3NT]
"Spingold in
Jazz City", TBW 10/1983, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
At Table One, Bergen, North, gave his
opponents a sporting chance at 700, but Stansby, West, was too gentlemantly to
shoot a sitting bird.
[He went to 3NT, down one.]
Ibid, p. 14
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[The famous case of
Bergen’s dubious claim]
"You make two trumps", said
declarer, Bergen, to Ross, West, showing his cards. "I’m not going to do
anything stupid," said Bergen, in the process of doing something stupid,
since he had claimed without considering the position if West should win and
lead a diamond.
Ibid, p. 17
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Bergen’s creativity was manifested on the
second deal of the match, where he picked up as dealer, nonvulnerable versus
vulnerable,
9 8 5 / A 10 9 8 / K 10 7 2 / 6 4
Seduced by those spot cards, he opened two
hearts, an ostensibly natural weak two-bid. [Partner goes to 4H] The silent
opponents were cold for two diamonds. Four hearts went down only 50.
"Spingold in Jazz
City, II", TBW 11/1983, p. 4
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Another Bergen preempt went sour when he
opened two spades, nonvulnerable, on
7 5 3 /Q / J 9 8 5 / J 10 6 5 3
This was, you will be relieved to learn, a
preempt in clubs. When the doubling stopped, partner was declarer at
three diamonds, down 300 -only a 5 imp loss, since Bergen’s teammates scored an
excellent plus 110.
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Bergen opens 2D, weak two
in spades, on
87642/J93/AK3/104
-opponents can make 6S!]
You may be surprised to see Bergen, East at
Table One, holding such a strong hand for his weak two, but remember that he
was vulnerable against not, which dictates caution. Hamman-Wolff have not
geared their bidding towards reaching six-spade contracts after enemy weak-two
spade bids (even Bergen’s).
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A Pakistani, on favorable vulnerability,
heard a strong, artificial one club to his right; he held
84 / 972 / 10 5 3 2/ J 10 8 4
Three clubs, he bid, friskily. Alas, partner had no sense of
humor. When the smoke cleared, PAKISTAN was in five clubs doubled, down six,
1100. The vulnerability was not favorable enough for that.
"Round 14", TBW
12/1983, p. 18
-------------------------------------------------------------------
West’s double was, presumably, a matter of
honor (not through the Iron Duke!) not score, since down one doubled,
for a swing of 850, yields the same 13 imps as one down undoubled.
"Stockholm
semi-finals", TBW 2/1984, p. 6
-------------------------------------------------------------------
You are the dealer with favorable
vulnerability, holding,
K 5 2 /A /Q 10 4 3/ Q 9 8 6 2
and open one diamond. (You wouldn’t? I’m
glad to hear it, but Meckstroth did open.)
Ibid, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Franco carefully picked his way among
winning lines and found the only losing line in a game everyone else made.
"Stockholm
semi-finals, II", TBW 3/1984, p. 5
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Lauria leaped to three spades, rather gaily.
LHO doubled (negative, thank the Lord), and Mosca had a little fun too, raising
to four spades. Szwarc-Mouiel had no sense of humor. They doubled, led trumps
early and collected (...) 1100.
Ibid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[A 3D weak jump overcall is
raised to 5D]
I would think that neither overcaller nor
(Lord knows!) advancer would be charmed at the prospect of defending, after
this start, but partnership discipline, or captaincy, or some such nonsense
must have been involved.
[All failed to sacrifice against slam, except...] At the fourth table, Szwarc of FRANCE was the
advancer, and he learned bridge back in the days when if you knew you had a
cheap save you didn’t let the opponents play slams you expected them to make.
Ibid, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------
They had been playing and playing for a week
and a half, using some 25 systems to make nearly 50,000 sensible bidding
decisions plus a few hundred flaky calls and a few dozen brilliant ones (a
brilliant call is a flaky one that works like a charm.)
"Same old story"
(1983 BB final), TBW 4/1984, p. 3
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The results throughout this match seem to
point to a strange conclusion: can it be that it pays to bid with strong hands,
and to pass with weak ones?
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[On overcalling 4H with a
hand like
9 6/ A Q J 9 8 7 3 2/ A J
6/ ---]
It is less obvious to me than it was to
Hamman and Lauria (...) that one should jump to four hearts with the West card.
(...) The major argument against preempting is that your side has no idea what
to do if the opponents bid on -you know nothing about partner’s hand, and he
knows next to nothing about yours. The usual tactic is for the preemptor to
double next to show extra values, as Lauria did (...) However, this double does
not solve the problem -it merely allows the preemptor to blame partner
for any bad result while claiming credit himself for any good one.
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Previously, Kaplan had
criticised a 1NT opening with a 5-card major that led in a loss]
With these cards,
K 10 4 / A K Q 6 5 / 7 4 / A 4 2
Franco opened a sensible one heart; at the
other table, Sontag preferred to preempt with one notrump -his sixth sense had
told him, perhaps, that the opponents were cold for four spades. Against the
one-heart opening, the Americans easily reached their game, scoring 620;
against one notrump, the Italians stopped at two spades, plus 170 -10 imps to
the USA. Now I know why to open one notrump with such hands.
Ibid, p. 17
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Both Easts reply 2C to
partner’s 1D on
A K / 9 5 / 10 6 4 3 / A K
Q J 5, end to 3NT]
Both auctions above bristled with modern
science, yet got nowhere. In the bad old days, everybody used to jump shift
with hands like East’s (vulgar and disgusting, I know), and the only problem
remaining was to stay out of seven. Is this progress?
Ibid, p. 17-18
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Garozzo, behind the heart bidder with,
10 9 7 / K J 9 8 2 / Q 7 6 / A 7
had been lulled to sleep by a long relay
auction when it came time to double.
"Same old story,
II" (1983 BB final), TBW 5/1984, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Then DeFalco-Franco had one of those unusual
unusual-notrump disasters, the sort they tell me never happen.
Ibid, p. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[At love all, West bids 3NT
at third position and North holds:
K J 10 9 7/ A 8 5 2/ 5/ K 9
6; partner is weak with spade void and five hearts]
In the dumb old days we used to have to pass
over one notrump with hands like North’s, accepting the fact that the odds were
wrong when opener had an ace more than we did. With our dumb luck (we were
lucky in the old days), we ended up plus 300 or so against four spades doubled.
Nowadays, there are all sorts of delicious devices for entering the auction.
At
Table Two, the Americans used Landy to get to four hearts doubled ... minus
500.
The
result at Table One demonstrates the advantages of Astro (actually a variation
of that convention, not the genuine original) over Landy. Rubin and Becker were
not about to insult their friend and mentor, Roger Stern, by doubling a
four-heart contract reached through a variation of his convention -they bid on,
instead [and went down
one]
Ibid, p. 12
-------------------------------------------------------------------
At Table Two West had bid spades, so of
course he led something else [against 3NT].
"Vanderbilt in San
Antone", TBW 7/1984, p. 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Most damaging to SONTAG['s team] was the new rule preventing opponents Bergen and
Cohen from opening weak two's without five cards in the suit they promised
(usually artificially) or five high-card points in the hand.
"Hooks and Crooks -
the '84 Spingold", 11/1984, p.7
-------------------------------------------------------------------
... so the loss from two-bids was held under
30 imps, an affordable price for a little fun.
Ibid, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------
At Table One, a diamond opening lead from
West would have given the defenders four easy tricks against four hearts. But
Cohen, West, is a champion, not a clod who leads singletons - he tried the club
four. [Declarer made 11
tricks]
Ibid, p. 10-11
-------------------------------------------------------------------
If you are wondering about South's strange
pass to five clubs, remember that his partner's third-seat openings are not
bonded by the Lloyd's of London, and that their one-diamond openings do not
promise diamonds.
Ibid, p. 14
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